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Abstract. Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division
and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we consider different lev-
els of three fundamental goals in cake cutting: fairness, Pareto optimality, and
strategyproofness. In particular, we present robust versions of envy-freeness and
proportionality that are not only stronger than their standard counter-parts but also
have less information requirements. We then focus on cake cutting with piecewise
constant valuations and present three desirable algorithms: CCEA (Controlled
Cake Eating Algorithm), MEA (Market Equilibrium Algorithm) and CSD (Con-
strained Serial Dictatorship). CCEA is polynomial-time, robust envy-free, and
non-wasteful. It relies on parametric network flows and recent generalizations of
the probabilistic serial algorithm. For the subdomain of piecewise uniform valua-
tions, we show that it is also group-strategyproof. Then, we show that there exists
an algorithm (MEA) that is polynomial-time, envy-free, proportional, and Pareto
optimal. MEA is based on computing a market-based equilibrium via a convex
program and relies on the results of Reijnierse and Potters [24] and Devanur et al.
[15]. Moreover, we show that MEA and CCEA are equivalent to mechanism 1 of
Chen et. al. [12] for piecewise uniform valuations. We then present an algorithm
CSD and a way to implement it via randomization that satisfies strategyproof-
ness in expectation, robust proportionality, and unanimity for piecewise constant
valuations. For the case of two agents, it is robust envy-free, robust proportional,
strategyproof, and polynomial-time. Many of our results extend to more general
settings in cake cutting that allow for variable claims and initial endowments.
We also show a few impossibility results to complement our algorithms. The im-
possibilities show that the properties satisfied by CCEA and MEA are maximal
subsets of properties that can be satisfied by any algorithm for piecewise constant
valuation profiles.
1 Introduction
Cake cutting is one the most fundamental topics in fair division (see e.g., [23, 8, 25]). It
concerns the setting in which a cake is represented by an interval [0, 1] and each of the
n agents has a value function over the cake. The main aim is to divide the cake fairly.
The framework is general enough to encapsulate the important problem of allocating
a heterogeneous divisible good among multiple agents with different preferences. The
cake cutting problem applies to many settings including the division of rent among
housemates, disputed land between land-owners, and work among co-workers. It is
especially useful in scheduling the use of a valuable divisible resource such as server
time.
Within the cake cutting literature, the most important criteria of a fair allocation are
envy-freeness and proportionality. In an envy-free allocation, each agent considers his
allocation at least as good as any other agent’s allocation. An envy-free allocation is
guaranteed to exist (see e.g., [28, 29]). In a proportional allocation, each agent gets at
least 1/n of the value he assigns to the cake. A desirable aspect of envy-freeness is that
it implies proportionality.3
Computation of a fair allocation of cake is one of the fundamental problems in
algorithmic economics. Brams and Taylor [7] designed an envy-free cake cutting al-
gorithm for an arbitrary number of players. Although their algorithm is guaranteed to
eventually terminate, its running time is unbounded. Moreover, the algorithm can di-
vide the cake into infinitely small segments. Since the result of Brams and Taylor [7],
researchers have examined restricted value density functions and proposed envy-free
algorithms for them. In order to ascertain the running time of a cake cutting algorithm,
it is important to know the computational model and input to the problem. In most
of the literature (see e.g., [25]), it is assumed that the value an agent ascribes to any
segment of the cake can be queried or evaluated via an oracle. While the classical liter-
ature uses this query model, computer scientists recently looked at the problem from the
point of view of full report, as is common in mechanism design. Throughout the paper
we focus on piecewise constant value density functions and piecewise uniform value
density functions. Piecewise constant value density functions are one of the most fun-
damental class of value functions. Piecewise uniform valuations are a restricted class of
piecewise constant valuations. Chen et al. [11, 12] presented a discrete, strategyproof,
polynomial-time, envy-free and Pareto optimal algorithm for piecewise uniform valua-
tions. They stated that generalizing their results for piecewise constant valuations is an
open problem. They also presented an envy-free and proportional algorithm that satis-
fies strategyproofness by resorting to randomization.
In this paper, we consider three of the most enduring goals in mechanism design and
fair division: fairness, Pareto optimality and strategyproofness. Since many fair division
algorithms need to be deployed on a large scale, we will also aim for algorithms that
are computationally efficient. Our main research question in this paper is as follows:
among the different levels of fairness, Pareto optimality, strategyproofness, and efficient
computability, what are the maximal set of properties that can be satisfied simultane-
ously for piecewise constant and piecewise uniform valuations? Our main contribution
is a detailed study of this question including the formulation of a number of desirable
cake cutting algorithms satisfying many of the properties.
In the case where Pareto optimality cannot be satisfied, we also consider a weaker
notion of efficient called non-wastefulness. Non-wastefulness dictates that every portion
3 This statement holds with the additional assumption of full allocation: that every portion of
the cake that is desired by at least one agent is allocated to some agent. Otherwise, the empty
allocation satisfies envy-freeness, but not proportionality.
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of the cake that is desired by at least one agent is allocated to some agent who desires
it.
For fairness, we not only consider the standard notions envy-freeness and propor-
tionality but we also propose the concept of robust fairness — in particular robust envy-
freeness and robust proportionality. The main idea of an allocation being robust envy-
free is that even if an agent readjusts his value density function, as long as the ordinal
information of the function is unchanged, then the allocation remains envy-free. The
main advantages of robust envy-freeness are less information requirements and envy-
freeness under uncertainty. 4
For strategic properties, we consider three notions of truthfulness namely strate-
gyproofness, weak group-strategyproofness and group-strategyproofness. In most of
the cake-cutting literature, an algorithm is considered ‘strategyproof’ if truth-telling is a
maximin strategy [6] and it need not be dominant strategy incentive compatible. When
we refer to strategyproofness, we will mean the reporting the truthful valuations is a
dominant strategy. This stronger notion of strategyproofness has largely been ignored
in cake-cutting barring a few recent exceptions [11, 12, 21, 20]. 5
We present CCEA (Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm) for piecewise constant valu-
ations and show that it is polynomial-time and robust envy-free and robust proportional.
CCEA depends on a reduction to the generalizations [1, 18] of the PS (probabilistic
serial) algorithm introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [3] in the context of ran-
dom assignments.6 The algorithm relies on solving the parametric network flows (see
e.g., [16]). We show that the algorithm can handle variable claims and private endow-
ments for piecewise constant valuations and also satisfies group-strategyproofness un-
der piecewise uniform valuations.
If we insist on Pareto optimality, then we show that there exists an algorithm which
we refer to as the MEA (Market Equilibrium Algorithm) that is discrete, polynomial-
time Pareto optimal, envy-free, and proportional for piecewise constant valuations. The
algorithm relies on the Walras equilibrium formulation of Reijnierse and Potters [24]
for finding an α-envy-free for general cake cutting valuations and the result of Deva-
nur et al. [15] that market equilibrium for Fischer markets with linear utilities can be
computed in polynomial time. Both CCEA and MEA not only coincide on piecewise
uniform valuations but are also group-strategyproof.
Although CCEA and MEA are desirable algorithms, they are not strategyproof for
piecewise constant valuations. We present another algorithm called CSD (Constrained
Serial Dictatorship) which is strategyproof in expectation, robust proportional, and sat-
isfies unanimity. For the important case of two agents7, it is polynomial-time, and robust
4 Although full information is a standard assumption in cake cutting, it can be argued that it is
unrealistic that agents have exact utility value for each segment of the cake. Even if they do
report exact utility values, they may be uncertain about these reports. Robust fairness bypasses
these issues.
5 Procaccia [23] writes that the “design of strategyproof cake cutting algorithms is largely an
open problem.”
6 The CC algorithm of Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [1] is a generalization of the EPS al-
gorithm [18] which in turn is a generalization of PS algorithm of Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[3].
7 Many fair division problems involve disputes between two parties.
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envy-free. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first cake cutting algorithm for piece-
wise constant valuations that satisfies strategyproofness, proportionality, and unanimity
at the same time. CSD requires some randomization to achieve strategyproof in expec-
tation. However, CSD is discrete in the sense that it gives the same utility guarantee
(with respect to the reported valuation functions) over all realizations of the random al-
location. Although CSD uses some essential ideas of the well-known serial dictatorship
rule for discrete allocation, it is significantly more involved.
Our main technical results are as follows.
Theorem 1. For cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations, there exists an algo-
rithm (CCEA) that is discrete, polynomial-time, robust envy-free, and non-wasteful.
Theorem 2. For cake cutting with with piecewise constant valuations, there exists an
algorithm (MEA) that is discrete, polynomial-time, Pareto optimal, and envy-free.
Theorem 3. For cake cutting with piecewise uniform valuations, there exists algo-
rithms (CCEA and MEA) that are discrete, group strategyproof, polynomial-time, robust
envy-free and Pareto optimal.
Theorem 4. For cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations, there exists a ran-
domized implemention of an algorithm (CSD) that is (ex post) robust proportional, (ex
post) symmetric, and (ex post) unanimous and strategyproof in expectation. For two
agents, it is polynomial-time, robust proportional and robust envy-free.
Our positive results are complemented by the following impossibility results. These
impossibility results suggest the properties satisfied by CCEA and MEA are maximal
subsets of properties that can be satisfied by any algorithm for piecewise constant valu-
ation profiles.
Theorem 5. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there
exists no algorithm that is both Pareto optimal and robust proportional.
Theorem 6. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there
exists no algorithm that is strategyproof, Pareto optimal, and proportional.
Theorem 7. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there
exists no algorithm that is strategyproof, robust proportional, and non-wasteful.
As a consequence of CCEA and MEA, we generalize the positive results regarding
piecewise uniform valuations in [11, 12] and piecewise constant valuations in [13] in
a number of ways such as handling richer cake cutting settings, handling more gen-
eral valuations functions, achieving a stronger envy-free concept, or a stronger strate-
gyproofness notion. Moreover, we prove that CCEA and MEA — two different algo-
rithms — are equivalent in the domain of piecewise constant valuations. Furthermore,
we show that both CCEA and MEA are generalizations of the main mechanism in
[12, 11]. We also show which combinations of properties are impossible to satisfy si-
multaneously. Some of our main results are summarized in Table 1.
After presenting our main results, we enrich the cake cutting domain in two ways.
We allow agents to have initial endowments of the cake. Moreover we consider the
more general setting in which agents may have different claims or entitlements to the
cake. We show that many of our results carry over to these more general settings.
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Restriction DISC R-EF EF R-PROP PROP GSP W-GSP SP PO UNAN POLYT
Algorithms
CCEA - + + + + + - - - - + +
CCEA pw uniform + + + + + + + + + + +
MEA + - + - + - - - + + +
MEA pw uniform + + + + + + + + + + +
CMSD - - - - + + - - + - + -
CMSD pw uniform - - - + + - - + + + -
CMSD 2 agents - + + + + - - + - + +
Table 1. Properties satisfied by the cake cutting algorithms for pw (piecewise) constant valua-
tions: DISC (discrete), R-EF (robust envy-freeness), EF (envy-freeness), R-PROP (robust pro-
portionality), PROP (proportionality), GSP (group strategyproof), W-GSP (weak group strate-
gyproof), SP (strategyproof), UNAN (unanimity), PO (Pareto optimal) and POLYT (polynomial-
time).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cake cutting setting
We consider a cake which is represented by the interval [0, 1]. A piece of cake is a
finite union of disjoint subintervals of [0, 1]. The length of an interval I = [x, y] is
len(I) = y − x. As usual, the set of agents is N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent has a piecewise
continuous value density function vi : [0, 1] → [0,∞]. The value of a piece of cake X
to agent i is Vi(X) =
∫
X vi(x)dx =
∑
I∈X
∫
I vi(x)dx. As generally assumed, valuations are
non-atomic (Vi([x, x]) = 0) and additive: Vi(X ∪ Y) = Vi(X) + Vi(Y) where X and Y
are disjoint. The basic cake cutting setting can be represented by the set of agents and
their valuations functions, which we will denote as a profile of valuations. In this paper
we will assume that each agent’s valuation function is private information for the agent
that is not known to the algorithm designer. Each agent reports his valuation function
to the designer and the designer then decides how to make the allocations based on the
reported valuations.
Later on we will also consider two important extensions of cake cutting: claims and
private endowments. We will assume that agents have the following claims on the cake
respectively: c1, . . . , cn. In the original cake cutting problem agents have equal claims.
Each agent i ∈ N has a private endowment ω(i) which is a segment of the cake privately
owned by i. The cake is assembled by joining the pieces ω(1), . . . , ω(n). Therefore the
cake cutting setting in its full generality can be represented as a quadruple (N, v, ω, c).
An allocation is a partitioning of the cake into n pieces of cake X1, . . . , Xn such that
the pieces are disjoint (aside from the interval boundaries) and Xi is allocated to agent
i ∈ N. A cake cutting algorithm takes as input (N, v, ω, c) and returns an allocation.
2.2 Preference functions
In this paper we will only consider piecewise uniform and piecewise constant valua-
tions functions. A function is piecewise uniform if the cake can be partitioned into a
finite number of intervals such that for some constant ki, either vi(x) = ki or vi(x) = 0
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over each interval. A function is piecewise constant if the cake can be partitioned into
a finite number of intervals such that vi is constant over each interval. In order to report
his valuation function to the algorithm designer, each agent will specify a set of points
{d1, ..., dm} that represents the consecutive points of discontinuity of the agent’s valua-
tion function as well as the constant value of the valuation function between every pair
of consecutive d j’s.
For a function vi, we will refer by ˆVi = {v′i : vi(x) ≥ vi(y) > 0 ⇐⇒ v′i(x) ≥ v′i(y) >
0 ∀x, y ∈ [0, 1]} as the set of density functions ordinally equivalent to vi. Note that if
an algorithm takes as input vi and returns the same output for any v′i ∈ ˆVi, then it is
oblivious to the exact cardinal information of vi.
2.3 Properties of allocations
An allocation is a partition of the interval [0, 1] into a set {X1, . . . , Xn,W}, where n is
the number of agents and Xi is a piece of cake that is allocated to agent i. And W is the
piece of the cake that is not allocated. All of the fairness and efficiency notations that
we will discuss next are with respect to the reported valuation functions. In an envy-free
allocation, we have Vi(Xi) ≥ Vi(X j) for each pair of agent i, j ∈ N,. An allocation is
individually rational if Vi(Xi) ≥ Vi(ω(i)). In a proportional allocation, each agent gets
at least 1/n of the value he has for the entire cake. An allocation satisfies symmetry or
equal treatment of equals if any two agents with identical valuations get same utility.
Clearly, envy-free implies proportionality and also symmetry. An allocation X is Pareto
optimal if no agent can get a higher value without some other agent getting less value.
Formally, X is Pareto optimal if there does not exists another allocation Y such that
Vi(Yi) ≥ Vi(Xi) for all i ∈ N and Vi(Yi) > Vi(Xi) for some i ∈ N. For any S ⊆ [0, 1],
define D(S ) = {i ∈ N|Vi(S ) > 0}. An allocation X is non-wasteful if for all S ⊆ [0, 1],
S ⊆ ∪i∈D(S )Xi. In other words, an allocation is non-wasteful if every portion of the cake
desired by at least one agent is allocated to some agent who desires it.
We now define robust analogues of the fairness concepts defined above. An alloca-
tion satisfies robust proportionality if for all i, j ∈ N and for all v′i ∈ ˆVi,
∫
Xi
v′i(x)dx ≥
1/n
∫ 1
0 v
′
i(x)dx. An allocation satisfies robust envy-freeness if for all i, j ∈ N and for
all v′i ∈ ˆVi,
∫
Xi
v′i(x)dx ≥
∫
X j
v′i(x)dx. Notice that both robust envy-freeness and robust
proportionality would require each agents to get a piece of cake of the same length if
every agent desires the entire cake.
We give an example of piecewise constant value density function and demonstrate
how the standard concept of envy-freeness is not robust under uncertainty.
Example 1 (A cake-cutting problem with piecewise constant valuations). Consider the
cake cutting problem in Figure 1.An allocation in which both agents get regions in
which their value density function is the highest is envy-free. Agent 1 gets utility one
for his allocation and has the same utility for the allocation of agent 2. However if its
probability density function is slightly lower in region [0, 0.1], then agent 1 will be
envious of agent 2.
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Fig. 1. Example of a cake cutting problem with piecewise constant value density functions. The
area with vertical lines is under the value density function of agent 1 and the area with horizontal
lines is under the value density function of agent 2.
0.1 0.3 0.5 1
10
3
2
Fig. 2. Example of a cake cutting problem with piecewise constant value density functions. The
area with vertical lines is under the value density function of agent 1 and the area with horizontal
lines is under the value density function of agent 2. The valuation functions of both agents are
ordinally equivalent to the ones in Figure 1.
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2.4 Properties of cake cutting algorithms
A deterministic cake cutting algorithm is a mapping from the set of valuation profiles
to the set of allocations. A randomized cake cutting algorithm is a mapping from the set
of valuation profiles to a space of distributions over the set of allocations. The output
of the algorithm in this case for a specific valuation profile is a random sample of the
distributional function over the set of allocation for that profile.
An algorithm (either deterministic or randomized) satisfies property P if it always
returns (with probability 1) an allocation that satisfy property P. A deterministic algo-
rithm is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misreport in order to get a
better allocation. The notion of strategyproofness is the one well-established in social
choice (see e.g., [17]) and much stronger than the notion of ‘strategyproofness’ used in
some of the cake-cutting literature (see e.g., [6]). By strategyproof, we mean truthful
as has been used in [11]. Similarly, a deterministic algorithm is group-strategyproof if
there exists no coalition S ⊆ N such that members of S can misreport their prefer-
ences so that each agent in S gets as preferred an allocation and at least one agent gets
a strictly better payoff. A deterministic algorithm is weak group-strategyproof if there
exists no coalition S ⊆ N such that members of S can misreport their preferences so
that each agent in S gets a strictly more preferred allocation. A randomized algorithm
is strategyproof in expectation if the expected utility from the random allocation that
every agent receives in expectation under a profile where he reported truthfully is at
least as large as the expected that he receives under a profile where he misreports while
fixing the other agents’ reports.
We say that a cake cutting algorithm satisfies unanimity, if when each agent’s most
preferred 1/n length of the cake is disjoint from another agent, 1/n length of the cake,
then each agent gets their most preferred piece of cake of length 1/n.
2.5 Relation between the properties of cake cutting algorithms
In this subsection, we recap the main properties of cake cutting algorithms: i) propor-
tionality, ii) robust proportionality, iii) envy-freeness, iv) robust envy-freeness, v) sym-
metry, vi) non-wastefulness, vii) Pareto optimality, viii) unanimity ix) strategyproof-
ness, x) weak group strategyproofness, xi) group strategyproofness, xii) polynomial-
time.
Remark 1. For cake cutting, a) Envy-freeness and non-wastefulness =⇒ proportional-
ity; b) Robust proportionality =⇒ proportionality; c) Robust envy-freeness =⇒ envy-
freeness; d) Robust envy-freeness and non-wastefulness =⇒ robust proportionality;
e) Group strategyproofness =⇒ weak group strategyproofness =⇒ strategyproof-
ness; f) Pareto optimality =⇒ non-wastefulness; g) Pareto optimality =⇒ unanimity;
h) two agents, proportionality =⇒ envy-freeness; i) two agents, robust proportionality
=⇒ robust envy-freeness.
2.6 The free disposal assumption
We may assume without lost of generality that every part of the cake is desired by at
least one agent. If that is not the case, then we can discard the parts that are desired
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by no one and rescale what is left so that we get a [0, 1] interval representation
of the cake. Notice that this procedure preserves the aforementioned properties of
fairness, efficiency and truthfulness. The free disposal assumption that we are making
is necessary to ensure strategyproofness for piecewise uniform valuation functions. See
[12] for a discussion on the necessity of this assumption.
Before we present our algorithms, we will first take a detour to the literature on random
assignments, as some of the algorithms in the random assignment literature are closely
related to our algorithms.
3 A detour to random assignments
An assignment problem is a triple (N, H,%) such that N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents,
H = {h1, . . . , hn} is a set of houses and %= (%1, . . . ,%n) is the preference profile in
which %i denotes the preferences of agent i over houses H. A deterministic assignment
is a one-to-one mapping from N to H. A random allocation is a probability distribution
over H. A random assignment p gives a random allocation to each agent. It can be
represented by a bistochastic matrix p in which the ith row is denoted by pi and all
i ∈ A, and h ∈ H, pih ≥ 0,
∑
j∈A p jh =
∑
h′∈H pih′ = 1.8 The term pih denotes the
probability with which agent i gets house h. An assignment problem has commonalities
with cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations. They also have some fundamental
differences. For example, in cake cutting, the agents do not have continuous constant
valuations over pre-determined segments of the cake.
Given two random assignments p and q, pi %S Di qi i.e., a player i weakly SD prefers
pi to qi if for all h,
∑
h j∈{hk:hk%ih} pih j ≥
∑
h j∈{hk :hk%ih} qih j . Another way to see the SD
relation is as follows. A player i weakly SD prefers allocation pi to qi if for all vNM
utilities consistent with his ordinal preferences, i gets at least as much expected utility
under pi as he does under qi. Furthermore p %S D q, i.e., p stochastically dominates q if
pi %S Di qi for all i ∈ N and q , p.
An algorithm satisfies SD-efficiency if each returned assignment is Pareto optimal
with respect to the SD-relation (see e.g., [34]). An algorithm satisfies SD envy-freeness
if each agent (weakly) SD prefers his allocation to that of any other agent. SD envy-
freeness is a very demanding notion of fairness. The reader may be able to notice that
our notion of robust envy-freeness in cake cutting is based on a similar idea as SD
envy-freeness. We will consider random allocations as fractional allocations and ran-
dom assignments as fractional assignments. Viewing the probability of getting a house
simply as getting a fraction of the house is especially useful when some houses are not
complete but only partial. In this vein, the definition of SD dominance should also be
considered from the perspective of fractional allocations rather than probability distri-
butions.
The most basic assignment problem concerns n agents having strict preferences
over n objects. For this basic setting a simple yet ingenious PS (probabilistic serial) al-
gorithm introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [3] and Cre`s and Moulin [14] which
8 The bistochasticity of the matrix p holds when there are the same number of agents as there are
objects, which can be assumed without lost of generality by adding dummy agents or objects
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uses the simultaneous eating algorithm (SEA). Each house is considered to have a di-
visible probability weight of one, and agents simultaneously and with the same eating
rate consume the probability weight of their most preferred house until no house is left.
The random allocation allocated to an agent by PS is then given by the amount of each
object he has eaten until the algorithm terminates. The main result of Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [3] was that the fractional assignment returned by the PS algorithm is SD
envy-free and SD-efficient.
The PS algorithm has been extended in various ways. The EPS (extended PS al-
gorithm) of Katta and Sethuraman [18] generalized PS to the case for indifferences
using parametric network flows. EPS also generalized the egalitarian rule of Bogomol-
naia and Moulin [5] for dichotomous preferences. Yilmaz [34] and Athanassoglou and
Sethuraman [1] extended the work of [18] to propose PS generalization which also takes
care of private endowments where ei indicates the endowment of agent i. For the case of
endowments, Yilmaz [34] introduced the idea of justified envy-freeness. An assignment
p satisfies justified envy-freeness if for all i, j ∈ N, pi %S Di p j or ¬(pi %S Dj e j.) The algo-
rithms in [34, 1] satisfy justified envy-freeness in the presence of private endowments.
In our algorithm CCEA, we rely on the full power of the controlled-consuming (CC) al-
gorithm of Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [1] which combines almost all the desirable
features of other extensions of PS. In particular, we use the following fact. There exists
an extension of the PS algorithm which can simultaneously handle indifferences in pref-
erences, unacceptable objects in preferences, allocation of multiple objects to agents,
agent owning fractions of houses, partial houses being available, and still returns an
assignments which satisfies SD justified envy-freeness and SD-efficiency. In addition,
if there are no private endowments, then the extension can also handle variable eating
rates. The Controlled-Consuming (CC) algorithm of Athanassoglou and Sethuraman
[1] can handle the case where each agent owns fractions of the complete houses. We
also require that for some houses, only an arbitrary fraction of the house is available
to the market. This can be handled by a modification to CC (page 30, [1]). Finally we
require the agents to want to be allocated as many houses as possible. This does not
require any modification to CC. In the absence of endowments but presence of variable
eating rates, CC is equivalent to the EPS algorithm that can also cater for variable eating
rates (Section 6.4, [18]).
4 CCEA — Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm
CCEA is based on CC (Controlled Consuming) algorithm of Athanassoglou and Sethu-
raman [1]. Since the original PS algorithm utilized the simultaneous eating algorithm,
hence the name Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm. CCEA first divides the cake up into
disjoint intervals each of whose endpoints are consecutive points of discontinuity of the
agents’ valuation functions. We will refer to these intervals as intervals induced by the
discontinuity points. The idea is to form a one-to-one correspondence of the set of cake
intervals with a set of houses of an assignment problem. Since intervals may have dif-
ferent lengths, we consider the house corresponding to the interval with the maximum
length as a complete house where as intervals corresponding to other houses are partial
houses. The preferences of agents over the houses are naturally induced by the relative
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height of the piecewise constant function lines in the respective intervals. If an agent i
owns a sub-interval J j, then in the housing setting, eih j is set to size(h j) and not to one.
The reason is that an agent can only own as much of the house as exists. The technical
heart of the algorithm is in CC (Controlled Consuming) algorithm of Athanassoglou
and Sethuraman [1]. We recommend the reader to Section 3.2 of [1] in which an illus-
trative example on CC is presented. Once CC has been used to compute a fractional
assignment p, it is straightforward to compute a corresponding cake allocation. If an
agent i gets a fraction of house h j, then in the cake allocation agent i gets the same
fraction of subinterval J j.
Input: Piecewise constant value functions.
Output: A robust envy-free allocation.
1 Divide the regions according to agent value functions. Let J = {J1, . . . , Jm} be the
set of subintervals of [0, 1] formed by consecutive marks.
2 Consider (N′, H,%, size(·)) where
– H = {h1, . . . , hm} where hi = Ji for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
– % is defined as follows: h %i h′ if and only if vi(x) ≥ vi(y) for x ∈ h and y ∈ h′;
%n+1 is defined in the way that each house in the market is unacceptable to agent
n + 1.
– size(h j) = 1 for h j ∈ arg max j∈{1,...,m}(len(J j));
size(h j) = len(J j)(max j∈{1,...,m}(len(J j)))
for all h j < arg max j∈{1,...,m}(len(J j));
3 p ←− CC(N′, H,%, size(·))
4 For interval J j, agent i is an allocated subinterval of J j, denoted by Jij, which is of
length pih j/size(h j)× len(J j). For example, if J j = [ai, bi], then one possibility of Jij
can be [ai +
∑i−1
n=1 pih j/size(h j) × len(J j), ai +
∑i
n=1 pih j/size(h j) × len(J j)].
Xi ←−
⋃m
j=1 Jij for all i ∈ N
5 return X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
Algorithm 1: Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm (CCEA) to compute a robust envy-
free allocation for piecewise constant value functions.
In Example 2, we show how CCEA transforms a cake cutting problem with piece-
wise constant valuations into a random assignment problem.
Example 2 (Illustration of CCEA). We examine how CCEA runs on the cake cut-
ting problem in Figure 1. Firstly, let J = {J1, . . . , J4} be the set of subintervals of
[0, 1] formed by consecutive points of discontinuity are identified: J1 = [0, 0.1], J2 =
[0.1, 0.3], J3 = [0.3, 0.5], and J4 = [0.5, 1]. J2 is discarded because it is desired by no
agent. In set {h1, h3, h4}, each house h j corresponds to subinterval J j. The preferences of
the agents over H are inferred from their valuation function height in the subintervals so
that h1 ≻1 h4 ≻1 h3 and h3 ∼2 h4 ≻2 h1. We also set the number of units of each house
that is available. Since J4 is the biggest interval, we consider h4 as complete house.
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So, size(h4) = 1, size(h1) = 0.2, and size(h3) = 0.4. If we run CC over the housing
market instance with the specified set of agents, houses, fraction of houses available to
the market, and agent preferences, then the assignment returned by CC is as follows:
p1h1 = 0.2, p1h3 = 0, p1h4 = 0.6, p2h1 = 0, p2h3 = 0.4, and p2h4 = 0.4. The house assign-
ment p can be used to divide the subintervals among the agents: X1 = {[0, 0.1], [0.7, 1]}
and X2 = {[0.3, 0.5], [0.5, 0.7]}.
CCEA satisfies the strong fairness property of robust envy-freeness.
Proposition 1. For piecewise constant valuations, CCEA satisfies robust envy-freeness
and non-wastefulness.
Let m be the number of relevant subintervals in a cake cutting problem with piece-
wise constant valuations.
Proposition 2. CCEA runs in time O(n5m2 log(n2/m)), where n is the number of agents
and m is the number of subintervals defined by the union of discontinuity points of the
agents’ valuation functions.
Although CCEA satisfies the demanding property of robust envy-freeness, it is not
immune to manipulation. We show that CCEA is not strategyproof even for two agents.
In the next section, we will present a different algorithm that is both robust envy-free
and strategyproof for two agents.
Proposition 3. For piecewise constant valuations, CCEA is not strategyproof even for
two agents.
If we restricted the preferences to piecewise uniform with no private endowment or
variable claims, then CCEA is not only strategyproof but group-strategyproof. We first
show that in this restricted setting, CCEA is in fact equivalent to the algorithm of [11].
Lemma 1. For piecewise uniform value functions with no private endowments and
variable claims, CCEA is equivalent to Mechanism 1 of Chen et al. [11].
Since the set of valuations that can be reported is bigger in cake cutting than in
the assignment problem, establishing group strategyproofness does not follow automat-
ically from group-strategyproofness of CC for dichotomous preferences (Theorem 2,
[5]). Using similar arguments, we give a detailed proof that CCEA and hence Mecha-
nism 1 of Chen et al. [11] is group strategyproof for piecewise uniform valuations.9 In
Section 8, we extend the result to the case where agents may have variable claims.
Proposition 4. For cake cutting with piecewise uniform value functions, CCEA is
group strategyproof.
For piecewise uniform valuations, CCEA is also Pareto optimal. The result follows
directly from lemma 1 along with the fact that Mechanism 1 of Chen et al. [11] is Pareto
optimal.
Proposition 5. For cake cutting with piecewise uniform value functions, CCEA is
Pareto optimal.
9 Chen et al. [11] had shown that their mechanism for piecewise uniform valuations is strate-
gyproof.
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5 MEA — Market Equilibrium Algorithm
In the previous section we presented CCEA which is not Pareto optimal for piecewise
constant valuations. It turns out that if we relax the robust notion of fairness to envy-
freeness, then we can use fundamental results in general equilibrium theory and recent
algorithmic advances [15] to formulate a convex program that always returns an envy-
free and Pareto optimal allocation as its optimal solution. For each valuation profile, let
J = {J1, . . . , Jk} be the intervals whose endpoints are consecutive points in the union of
break points of the agents’ valuation functions. Let xi j be the length of any subinterval
of Ji that is allocated to agent j. Then we run a convex program to compute a Pareto
optimal and envy-free allocation. We will call the convex program outlined in Algo-
rithm 2 as the Market Equilibrium Algorithm (MEA). MEA is based on computing the
market equilibrium via a primal-dual algorithm for a convex program that was shown
to be polynomial-time solvable by Devanur et al. [15]. Notice that if we ignore strate-
gyproofness, or in other words, if we assume that agents report truthfully, then agents
are truly indifferent between which subinterval they receive since their valuation func-
tion is a constant over any Ji. Hence, one we determine the length of J j to be allocated
to an agent, we can allocate any subinterval of that length to the agent.
Input: Cake-cutting problem with piecewise constant valuations.
Output: A proportional, envy-free, and Pareto optimal allocation.
1 Let J = {J1, . . . , Jk} be the intervals whose endpoints are consecutive points in the union of
break points of the agents’ valuation functions.
2 Let xi j be the length of any subinterval of Ji that is allocated to agent j.
3 li ←− len(Ji)
4 Solve the following convex program.
min −
n∑
j=1
log(u j)
s.t. u j =
k∑
i=1
vi j xi j ∀ j = 1, . . . , n
n∑
j=1
xi j ≤ li ∀i = 1, . . . , k
xi j ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
5 Let u⋆j , x⋆i j be an optimal solution to the convex program. Partition every interval Ji into n
subintervals where the j-th subinterval J ji has length x⋆i j.
6 Y j ←− ∪ki=1J
j
i be the allocation of each j = 1, . . . , n.
7 return Y = (Y1, . . . ,Yn).
Algorithm 2: The Market Equilibrium Algorithm to compute a Pareto optimal, envy-
free, and proportional allocation.
Proposition 6. MEA is polynomial-time, Pareto efficient and envy free.
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We mention here that the connection between a fair and efficient algorithm for cake
cutting and computing market equilibria was already pointed by Reijnierse and Potters
[24]. Reijnierse and Potters [24] presented an algorithm to compute an approximately
envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation for cake cutting with general valuations. How-
ever their algorithm is not polynomial-time even for piecewise constant valuations [37].
MEA requires the machinery of convex programming. It remains open whether
MEA can be implemented via linear programming. Cohler et al. [13] presented an al-
gorithm that uses a linear program to compute an optimal envy-free allocation. The
allocation is Pareto optimal among all envy-free allocations. However it need not be
Pareto optimal in general.
Although MEA is not robust envy-free like CCEA, it is Pareto optimal because
it maximizes the Nash product. What is interesting is that under uniform valuations,
both MEA and CCEA are equivalent. In the next result we demonstrate this equiva-
lence (Proposition 7). The proof requires a careful comparison of both CCEA and MEA
under uniform valuations.
Proposition 7. For piecewise uniform valuations, the allocation given by CCEA is
identical to that given by MEA.
Corollary 1. For piecewise uniform valuations, MEA is group-strategyproof.
Thus if we want to generalize Mechanism 1 of Chen et al. [11] to piecewise con-
stant valuations and maintain robust envy-freeness then we should opt for CCEA. On
the other hand, if want to still achieve Pareto optimality, then MEA is the appropriate
generalization. In both generalization, we lose strategyproofness.
6 Impossibility Results
Thus far, we presented two polynomial time algorithms, each of which satisfies a dif-
ferent set of properties. CCEA is robust envy-free and non-wasteful, whereas MEA is
Pareto optimal and envy-free. This naturally leads to the following question: does there
exist an algorithm satisfies all of the properties that CCEA and MEA satisfy? It turns out
that the answer is no, as Theorem 5 shows that there is no algorithm that is both Pareto
efficient and robust proportional. Similarly, Theorem 6 argues that there is no algorithm
that satisfies the properties CCEA satisfies along with strategyproofness. Lastly, Theo-
rem 7 argues that there is no algorithm that satisfies the properties CCEA satisfies plus
strategyproofness. The impossibility results are summarized in Table 2.
Impossibility Reference
Pareto efficient and robust proportional Theorem. 5
Strategyproof, Pareto optimal, and proportional Theorem 6
Strategyproof, robust proportional, and non-wasteful Theorem 7
Table 2. Impossibility results for cake-cutting algorithms for piecewise constant valuations.
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Consequently, we may conclude that the properties satisfied by CCEA and MEA are
respectively maximal subsets of properties that an algorithm can satisfy for piecewise
constant valuations.
7 CSD — Constrained Serial Dictatorship Algorithm
In the previous sections, we saw that CCEA and MEA are only strategyproof for piece-
wise uniform valuations. In light of the impossibility results established in the preivous
section, it is reasonable to ask what other property along with strategyproofness can
be satisfied by some algorithm. It follows from (Theorem 3, [26]) that the only type of
strategyproof and Pareto optimal mechanisms are dictatorships. Chen et al. [12] raised
the question whether there exists a strategyproof and proportional algorithm for piece-
wise constant valuations. The algorithm CSD answers this question partially.
Before diving into the CSD algorithm, it is worth noting that there is some funda-
mental difference between random assignment setting and the cake cutting setting. In
the random assignment setting, the objects that we are allocating are well defined and
known to the public. On the other hand, in the cake cutting setting, the discontinuity
points of each agent’s valuation function is private information for the agent. Hence,
any algorithm that uses the reported discontinuity points to artificially create the ob-
jects runs into the risk of having the objects created by the algorithm be manipulated
by the reports of the agents. In order to illustrate this difficulty, consider the uniform
allocation rule. The uniform allocation rule (that assigns 1/n of each house) [10] is both
strategyproof and proportional in the random assignment setting. However it cannot be
adapted for cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations since strategyproofness is
no longer satisfied if allocating 1/n of each interval (induced by the agent valuations)
is done deterministically.
Proposition 8. The uniform allocation rule (done deterministically) is not strate-
gyproof.
Now we are ready to present CSD. In order to motivate CSD, we will give a
randomized algorithm that is strategyproof and robust proportional in expectation. The
algorithm is a variant of random dictatorship: each agent has uniform probability of
being chosen as a dictator. However, if the whole cake is acceptable to each agent,
then each time a dictator is chosen, he will take the whole cake. This approach is not
helpful since we return to square one of having to divide the whole cake. We add an
additional requirement which is helpful. We require that each time a dictator is chosen,
the piece he takes has to be of maximum value 1/n length of the total size of the cake.
We will call this algorithm Constrained Random Serial Dictatorship (CRSD). Formally
speaking, CRSD draws a random permutation of the agents. The algorithm then makes
the allocation to agents in the order that the lottery is drawn. Everytime when it is
agent i’s turn to receive his allocation, CRSD looks at the remaining portion of the
cake and allocates a maximum value 1/n length piece of the cake to agent i (break ties
arbitrarily). Notice that CRSD is strategyproof, as in every draw of lottery, it is in the
best interest of the agents to report their valuation function truthfully in order to obtain
a piece that maximizes his valuation function out of the remaining pieces of cake. Later
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Input: Cake-cutting problem with piecewise constant valuations.
Output: A robust proportional allocation.
1 for each π ∈ ΠN do
2 C ←− [0, 1] (intervals left)
3 for i = 1 to n do
4 Xπ
π(i) ←− maximum preference cake piece of size 1/n from C
5 C ←− C − Xπ
π(i).
6 i ←− i + 1.
7 end for
8 end for
9 Construct a disjoint and exhaustive interval set J ′ induced by the discontinuities in agent
valuations and the cake cuts in the n! cake allocations.
10 Yi ←− empty allocation for each i ∈ N.
11 for each J j = [a j, b j] ∈ J ′ do
12 for each i ∈ N do
13 Let pi j =
count(i,J j)
n! where count(i, J j) is the number of permutations in which i gets J j.
14 Generate Ai j ⊆ J j, which is of length pi j |J j| according to some subroutine.
15 Yi ←− Yi ∪ Ai j
16 end for
17 end for
18 return Y = (Y1, . . . ,Yn)
Algorithm 3: CSD (Constrained Serial Dictatorship)— proportional and unanimous
algorithm for piecewise constant valuations
on we will see, through the proof of Proposition 10, that CRSD is robust proportional
in expectation.
CSD is an algorithm that derandomizes CRSD by looking at its allocation for all
n! different permutations and aggregate them in a suitable manner. The algorithm is
formally presented as Algorithm 3.
Although CSD does not necessarily require n! cuts of the cake, it may take expo-
nential time if the number of agents is not a constant. In Example 3, we illustrate how
CSD works.
Example 3 (Illustration of CSD). We implement CSD on the cake cutting problem in
Figure 1.For permutation 12, agent 1 first chooses the cake piece {[0, 0.1], [0.6, 1]}
and agent 2 then takes the remaining piece {[0.1, 0.6]}. For permutation 21, agent 2
first chooses the cake piece {[0.3, 0.8]} and agent 1 then takes the remaining piece
{[0, 0.3], [0.8, 1]}.
The set of all relevant subintervals induced by the two permutations are
{[0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.3], [0.3, 0.6], [0.6, 0.8], [0.8, 1]}. When we we additionally consider the
discontinuities in the players’ valuations, the set of relevant subintervals is J ′ =
{[0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.3], [0.3, 0.5], [0.5, 0.6], [0.6, 0.8], [0.8, 1].
Then
Y1 = {[0, 0.1],
1
2
[0.1, 0.3], 1
2
[0.6, 0.8], [0.8, 1]}
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1: Generate U j ∼ uni f [a j, b j].
2: For a j ≤ x ≤ 2b j − a j, let mod (x) = x if a j ≤ x ≤ b j and x − (b j − a j) if x > b j. Let
Ai j = [ mod (U j +
i−1∑
k=1
pk j(b j − a j)), mod (U j +
i∑
k=1
pk j(b j − a j))]
if mod (U j +∑i−1k=1 pk j(b j − a j)) ≤ mod (U +∑ik=1 pk j(b j − a j)) and
Ai j = [a j, mod (U j +
i∑
k=1
pk j(b j − a j))] ∪ [ mod (U j +
i−1∑
k=1
pn j(b j − a j)), b j]
otherwise.
Algorithm 4: A subroutine that converts fractional allocation into subintervals via ran-
domization
and
Y2 = {
1
2
[0.1, 0.3], [0.3, 0.5], [0.5, 0.6], 1
2
[0.6, 0.8]}.
Proposition 9. For piecewise constant valuations, CSD is well-defined and returns a
feasible cake allocation in which each agents gets a piece of size 1/n.
Proposition 10. For piecewise constant valuations, CSD satisfies robust proportional-
ity and symmetry.
Notice that unlike CRSD, CSD interprets the probability of allocating each interval
to an agent as allocation a fractional portion of the interval to that agent. Unless the
actual way of allocating the fractions is specified, one cannot discuss the notion of
strategyproofness for CSD because a deviating agent is unable to properly evaluate
his allocation against his true valuation function in the reported profile. Contrary to
intuition, CSD may or may not be strategproof depending on how the fractional parts
of each interval are allocated. In fact, the following remark illustrates this issue.
Remark 2. CSD is not strategyproof if the fraction of each interval of J ′ is allocated
deterministically (please see the appendix for the proof).
In light of difficulty, we will implement a method (see Algorithm 4) that randomly
allocating the fractions of intervals to agents. With this implementation, CSD is strate-
gyproof in expectation.
We will refer this randomized implemention of CSD as Constrained Mixed Serial
Dictatorship, or CMSD for short.
Proposition 11. CSD implemented with the aforementioned random allocation rule is
strategyproof in expectation.
Although CSD is strategyproof in expectation, it fails to satisfy truthfulness based
on group-based deviations no matter how the fractional parts of each interval are allo-
cated.
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Proposition 12. For cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations, CSD is not
weakly group-strategyproof even for two agents.
Moreover, for cake cutting with piecewise uniform valuations, CSD is not weakly
group-strategyproof for at least seven agents. The statement above follows from the fact
that RSD is not weakly group-strategyproof for dichotomous preferences when there are
at least seven agents [4, 5].
Even though CSD satisfies both proportionality and symmetry, it does not satisfy
the stronger notion of envy-freeness.
Proposition 13. CSD is not necessarily envy-free for three agents even for piecewise
uniform valuations.
Another drawback of CSD is that it is not Pareto optimal for piecewise constant val-
uations. The statement follows from the fact that RSD is not SD-efficient [3]. However
for the case of two agents, it is robust envy-free and polynomial-time.
Proposition 14. For two agents and piecewise constant valuations, CSD is robust envy-
free, and polynomial-time but not Pareto optimal.
Remark 3. For piecewise uniform valuations, CSD can be modified to be made Pareto
optimal. The main change is that for each permutation CSD, the resultant outcome
needs to be made Pareto optimal. This can be done by using the idea in [2].
8 Extensions
In this section, we show how some of our positive results concerning CCEA extend to
more general settings where agents may have variable claims or they may have initial
endowments (please see Algorithm 5).
8.1 Variable claims
We consider the concept of variable claims in cake cutting. It is generally assumed
in the literature that each agent has equal claim to the cake. In this case we modify the
definition of proportionality and envy-freeness accordingly. Reasoning about claims has
a long tradition in the fair division literature. However this strand of research assumes
that agents have uniform and identical preferences over the whole of the divisible object
and their only concern is the proportion of the object they get (see e.g., [30, 35]). Brams
and Taylor [8] refer to variable claims as entitlements and touch upon entitlements in
cake cutting at a few places in their book. They present a general idea of handling
entitlements by cloning agents (Page 152, [8]) but doing so can lead to an exponential
blowup of time and space. Brams et al. [9] also considered entitlements in pie-cutting
but presented an impossibility result and also a positive result for two agents. On the
other hand, one of our algorithms handles variable claims for arbitrary number of agents
and does not require cloning.
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Input: Piecewise constant value functions with priority claims (c1, . . . , cn) or private endow-
ments (ω1, . . . , ωn)
Output: A robust envy-free and individually rational allocation.
1 Let N′ = N ∪ {n + 1} where n + 1 is the agent owning all public cake but with no interest in
any of the cake. Join the segments ω(1), . . . , ω(n), ω(n + 1) to assemble a cake.
2 Divide the regions according to agent value functions. Let J = {J1, . . . , Jm} be the set of
subintervals of [0, 1] formed by consecutive marks.
3 Consider (N′,H,%, e, rate(·), size(·)) where
– H = {h1, . . . , hm} where hi = Ji for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
– % is defined as follows: h %i h′ if and only if vi(x) ≥ vi(y) for x ∈ h and y ∈ h′;
%n+1 is defined in the way that each house in the market is unacceptable to agent n + 1.
– size(h j) = 1 for h j ∈ arg max j∈{1,...,m}(len(J j));
size(h j) = len(J j)(max j∈{1,...,m}(len(J j)))
for all h j < arg max j∈{1,...,m}(len(J j));
– rate(i) = claim(i);
– eih j = size(h j) if J j ∈ ω(i) and zero otherwise.
4 p ←− CC(N′,H,%, e, rate(·), size(·))
5 For interval J j, agent i is allocated a subinterval of J j, denoted by Jij, which is of length
pih j/size(h j) × len(J j).
Xi ←−
⋃m
j=1 pih j/size(h j)J j for all i ∈ N
6 return X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
Algorithm 5: Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm (CCEA) to compute a robust envy-
free allocation for piecewise constant value functions. CCEA works for either private
endowments or variable claims but is not defined for both.
An allocation satisfies proportionality for variable claims if Vi(Xi) ≥
ci/
∑
j∈N c jVi([0, 1]) for all i ∈ N. An allocation satisfies robust proportionality for vari-
able claims if for all i ∈ N and for all v′i ∈ ˆVi,
∫
Xi
v′i (x)dx ≥ (ci/
∑
j∈N c j)
∫
[0,1] v
′
i(x)dx.
An allocation satisfies envy-freeness for variable claims, if Vi(Xi) ≥ (ci/c j)Vi(X j)
for all i, j ∈ N.
An allocation satisfies robust envy-freeness for variable claims if for all i, j ∈ N and
for all v′i ∈ ˆVi,
∫
Xi
v′i(x)dx ≥ (ci/c j)
∫
X j
v′i (x)dx.
Proposition 15. For cake cutting with variable claims and piecewise constant valua-
tions, CCEA satisfies robust envy-freeness for variable claims.
For uniform valuations, group-strategyproofness of CCEA even holds when agents
have variable claims.
Proposition 16. For cake cutting with piecewise uniform value functions and variable
claims, CCEA is group-strategyproof.
On the other hand, it can be shown that the following natural modification of CSD
does not satisfy proportionality in the presence of variable claims: each agent i gets
ci/(∑ j∈n c j) length of the most preferred interval for each permutation.
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We note that MEA can be easily adapted to cater for variable claims. Each agent’s
budget is proportional to his claim.
Proposition 17. For cake cutting with with piecewise constant valuations and variable
claims, there exists an algorithm (MEA) that is polynomial-time, Pareto optimal, envy-
free, and proportional.
8.2 Private endowments
In the cake cutting literature, the cake is generally considered to be a public good which
is divided among the agents. It could also be that each agent brings part of the cake and
then the assembled cake needs to be reassigned among the agents fairly. We call the
setting cake cutting with private endowments. In this context, individual rationality is a
minimal requirement and envy-freeness need to be redefined. Classic cake cutting can
be modelled by cake cutting with private endowments in the following manner: none
of the agents have any endowments and one additional agents owns the whole cake but
has no interest in the cake.
An allocation is individually rational if Vi(Xi) ≥ Vi(ω(i)). An allocation satisfies
justified envy-freeness for private endowments if Vi(Xi) ≥ Vi(X j) or V j(Xi) < V j(ω( j))
for each pair of agent i, j ∈ N. Either i should not be envious of j or if he is envious,
then giving i’s allocation to j violates individual rationality.10 It is not entirely clear how
to obtain the canonical concept of justified envy-freeness which takes into account both
private endowments and variable claims.
An allocation satisfies robust justified envy-freeness for private endowments if for all
i, j ∈ N either ∀v′i ∈ ˆVi :
∫
Xi
v′i(x)dx ≥
∫
X j
v′i(x)dx or ∃v′j ∈ vˆ j :
∫
Xi
v′j(x)dx <
∫
ω( j) v
′
j(x)dx.
If i does not get an unambiguously as preferred a piece as j’s, j has a counter claim that
j’s endowment is better than i’s piece for some ordinally equivalent valuation function
of j.
Proposition 18. For cake cutting with private endowments and piecewise constant val-
uations, CCEA satisfies robust justified envy-freeness for private endowments.
Generalizing CSD to handle endowments without losing its properties seems to be
a challenging task. We have not addressed it in this paper.
9 Related work and discussion
A mathematical analysis of cake cutting started with the work of Polish mathematicians
Steinhaus, Knaster, and Banach [27]. As applications of fair division have been identi-
fied in various multiagent settings, a topic which was once considered a mathematical
curiosity has developed into a full-fledged sub-field of mathematical social sciences (see
e.g., [22]). In particular, in the last few decades, the literature of cake cutting has grown
considerably (see e.g., [22, 8, 25, 23]).
10 The definition of justified envy-freeness for private endowments is based on a similar concept
due to Yilmaz [34] for the domain of housing assignment problems.
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The relation between the random assignment problem and cake cutting has been
noticed before [12]. However, in their discussion of related work, Chen et al. argue that
techniques from the random assignment literature cannot be directly applied even to
piecewise uniform functions—a subclasses of piecewise constant functions. Stumbling
blocks identified include the fact that in the random assignment problem, each agents
gets one object. We observed that PS satisfies envy-freeness even when agents get mul-
tiple objects.11 Another issue raised is that ‘if two agents desire two subintervals, both
agents would value the longer subinterval more than the shorter.’ This problem can be
circumvented by using the algorithm to compute the greatest common denominator of
the lengths of the intervals and then dividing the intervals in equally sizes subinter-
vals. However the number of subintervals can be exponential in the input size. We use
the idea of Athanassoglou and Sethuraman [1] that some houses may only be partially
available.
Chen et al. [12] stated that generalizing their strategyproof algorithm for piecewise
uniform valuations to the case for piecewise constant valuations as an open problem.
We presented two algorithms — CCEA and MEA — that generalize Mechanism 1 of
Chen et al. [11, 12]. Although they both satisfy certain desirable properties, both natural
generalizations are not strategyproof.
A number of works in the cake-cutting literature reason about strategyproofness.
However they refer to a very weak notion of strategyproofness which is equivalent to a
maximin strategy. Apart from the papers of Chen et al. [11, 12], we are aware of no pos-
itive results regarding discrete, strategyproof, and fair algorithms even for the restricted
domain of piecewise constant valuations. In this paper we present a proportional algo-
rithm (CSD) for piecewise constant valuations that although not formally strategyproof
seems less like likely to manipulate in comparison to CCEA. If we are allowed to use
randomization, then we show that CSD can be adapted to be strategyproof in expec-
tation. Notice that if we instead require our algorithm to be strategyproof always, and
proportional in expectation, then CRSD would satify these properties. Moreover, we
note that Chen et al. [11] also presented an algorithm that is randomized, envy-free and
proportional, and strategyproof in expectation. However, it does not satisfy unanimity
and requires much more randomization in contrast to CSD. It remains an open question
whether there exists an algorithm that always returns a proportional allocation and is
always immune to agent manipulation.
A difficulty that arises in coming up with strategyproof and proportional algorithm
lies in that there is no restriction on the distribution of the discontinuity points of the
agents’ valuation functions. To illustrate this point, suppose the algorithm designer
knows that the discontinuity points of the agents’ valuation functions come from a set
S = {x1, . . . , xk}, where 0 ≤ x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xk ≤ 1. Consequently, a mechanism that parti-
tions [0, 1] into intervals of the form [xi, xi+1] and allocates 1/n of each interval to each
agent would be proportional, envy-free and strategyproof. Even if the designer does not
know such a S , but instead we require the minimum distance between any two consec-
utive discontinuity points of the agent’s valuation function to be at least some ǫ > 0,
then there exists a strategyproof and δ-proportional algorithm for this setting.
11 Even in the first paper on the PS algorithm for strict preferences, it was observed that PS can
be extended to the case where there are many more objects than agents (Page 310, [3]).
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As for private endowments, we are only aware of [31] where private endowment are
considered in pie-cutting. However, in comparison to our positive results concerning
envy-freeness, Thomson [31] presents a negative result concerning the core.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we made a number of conceptual and technical contributions. It will be
interesting to consider new results with respect to robust versions of fairness, endow-
ments, and variable claims. Cake cutting is an exciting sub-field of microeconomics
with numerous applications to computer science. In order for theory to be more rele-
vant to practice, we envision exciting work in much richer models of cake cutting.
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Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Consider the following two-agent profile.
Agent 1:
v1(x) = v1a for x ∈ [0, 0.5], v1(x) = v1b for x ∈ (0.5, 1].
Agent 2:
v2(x) = v2a for x ∈ [0, 0.5], v2(x) = v2b for x ∈ (0.5, 1].
Choose v1a, v1b, v
2
a, v
2
b > 0 in such a way that v
1
a > v
1
b and v
2
a > v
2
b and
v1a
v1b
>
v2a
v2b
.
By either robust envy-freeness or robust proportionality, the mechanism must make the
following allocation x where x1a = x1b = x
2
a = x
2
b = 0.25. On the other hand, in order for
the mechanism to be Pareto efficient, x must be an element of P1 = {x|x1b = 0 or x
2
a = 0}.
Hence, we have reached an impossibility. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. For cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations and n ≥ 2, it follows from
(Theorem 3, [26]) that the only type of strategyproof and Pareto optimal mechanisms
are dictatorships. Consequently, there exists no strategyproof and Pareto optimal mech-
anism that is also proportional or symmetric. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. The following example shows that there exists no cake-cutting algorithm that is
strategyproof, robust proportional, and non-wasteful.
Profile 1:
1 : v1(x) = a if x ∈ [0, 0.5], v1(x) = b if x ∈ [0.5, 1]
2 : v2(x) = a if x ∈ [0, 0.5], v2(x) = b if x ∈ [0.5, 1]
for some a > b > 0.
Since the algorithm is robust proportional, it must be the case that each agent receive
1/2 of [0, 0.5] and 1/2 of [0.5, 1]. This is because the fractional parts of [0, 0.5] and
[0.5, 1] that each agent receives must stochastically dominate the uniform allocation,
otherwise the allocation would not satisfy proportionality for some valuation function
in the ordinal equivalence class.
Without lost of generality (up to reordering and regrouping of the cake), we
may assume that agent 1 receives [0, 0.25] ∪ [0.5, 0.75] and agent 2 receives
[0.25, 0.5]∪ [0.75, 1].
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Now consider profile 2:
1 : v1(x) = a if x ∈ [0, 0.25], v1(x) = b if x ∈ [0.5, 0.75], v1(x) = 0 otherwise
2 : v2(x) = a if x ∈ [0, 0.5], v2(x) = b if x ∈ [0.5, 1]
By SP, agent 1 must again receive [0, 0.25] ∪ [0.5, 0.75] and agent 2 receives
[0.25, 0.5] ∪ [0.75, 1]. If agent 1 receives anything less in profile 2, then he would
deviate from profile 2 to profile 1. If agent 1 receives anything more in profile 2, then
he would deviate from profile 1 to profile 2.
Now consider profile 3:
1 : v1(x) = a if x ∈ [0, 0.25], v1(x) = b if x ∈ [0.5, 0.75], v1(x) = 0 otherwise
2 : v2(x) = a + ǫ if x ∈ [0, 0.25], v2(x) = a if x ∈ [0.25, 0.5], v2(x) = b if x ∈ [0.5, 1]
By robust proportionality, both agent 1 and 2 must receive 1/2 of [0, 0.25]. By non-
wastefulness, agent 2 must receive [0.25, 0.5] and [0.75, 1] since agent 1 has a utility of
0 on these intervals. Hence, agent 2 in profile 2 would misreport so that he receives the
allocation in profile 3.
⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof (Sketch). First of all, CCEA is non-wasteful because an agent is never allowed
to eat a piece of the cake that he has no desire for. On the other hand, the algorithm
terminates only when every portion of the cake that is desired by at least one agent is
completely consumed by some agent who desires it.
Next, we show that the algorithm is robust envy-free. Consider a fractional assign-
ment p returned by the CC algorithm. Without private endowments CC is equivalent to
the EPS algorithm of Katta and Sethuraman [18]. Assignment p satisfies justified envy-
freeness in presence of variable eating rates: ui(pi) ≥ ui(p j) for all utilities u consistent
with preferences of i over the houses. The intuition is that at any point during the run-
ning of CC, an agent i will be ‘eating’ his most favoured object(s) at the same rate as
any other agent j even if j is also the eating the same object(s). Hence, for all v′i ∈ ˆVi, it
is the case that for j , i,
∫
Xi
v′i(x)dx ≥
∫
X j
v′i(x)dx.
⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof (Sketch). For a cake cutting instance I, |I| = nm is the input size where n is the
number of agents and m is the number of relevant subintervals. Once the lengths of the
subintervals in {J1, . . . , Jm} are computed, the size of each house can be computed in
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linear time. The number of houses in CCEA is m. We now analyse the running time of
CC on n agents and m houses (Section 3.5, [1]). In the CC algorithm, the flow network
consists of |V | vertices and |E| arcs where |V | = O(n2) and |E| = O(n2m). The number
of parametric flow problems needed to be solved is O(nm). A parametric flow network
problem can be solved in time O(|V ||E| log(|V |2/|E|)) due to Gallo et al. [16]. Hence, the
running time of CCEA is O(nm(n2)(n2m) log(n4/n2m)) = O(n5m2 log(n2/m)). ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof (Sketch). CCEA is not strategyproof even if all the piecewise intervals are of
equal length, and there are no private endowments or variable claims, and agents have
strict preferences over the intervals. In this case CCEA is equivalent to the classic PS
algorithm. It is known that PS is not strategyproof even for strict preferences when there
are more objects than agents [19]. ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof (Sketch). In the absence of private endowments and variable claims, CCEA can
be solved by invoking EPS instead of CC but with the slight modification that in the
corresponding flow network of EPS, the capacity of each arc (h, t) is set to size(h) in
step 2 of EPS (Algorithm 1, [18]). Let us refer to this simplified CCEA as SimpleCCEA.
When SimpleCCEA is run, it invokes EPS and solves repeated parametric network flow
problems (Step 3, Algorithm 1, [18]). In the step, EPS computes a bottleneck set of
agents and houses at each break-point. SimpleCCEA computes bottleneck sets in the
same way as Mechanism 1 of Chen et al. [11] and then allocates the resources in the
bottleneck sets to the agents in the bottleneck set. The flow networks of the slightly
modified EPS (Figure 2, [18]) and that of Mechanism 1 (Figure 2, [11]) are identical
with only two insignificant differences namely that in the flow network of Mechanism 1
of Chen et al. [11] i) the source and target are swapped and all the arcs are inverted and
ii) the size of the houses/intervals is not normalized. However, the eventual allocations
are same. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. In light of lemma 1, it suffices to show that SimpleCCEA is GSP. We begin with
some notations.
Let len(X) denote the length of X ⊆ [0, 1]. Since the utility function is piecewise uni-
form, it suffices to consider the length of pieces of the cake that are desired by each
agent.
Let S ⊆ N be a coalition of agents who misreport their true preference.
Let I denote the instance where every agent reports truthfully and I′ denote the instance
where agents in S misreport.
Let D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ [0, 1] denote the pieces of cake that are truly desired by each agent.
Let D′1, . . . , D
′
n ⊆ [0, 1] denote the desired pieces of cake that are reported by each
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agent.
Let A1, . . . , An ⊆ [0, 1] denote the allocation received by each agent under truthful re-
ports.
Let A′1, . . . , A
′
n ⊆ [0, 1] denote the allocation received by each agent when the agents in
S misreport.
Let X1, . . . , Xk be the bottleneck sets of agents with respect to the true preferences of
agents arranged in the order that they are being allocated by the algorithm in instance I.
Let X′1, . . . , X
′
p be the bottleneck sets of agents with respect to the true preferences of
agents arranged in the order that they are being allocated by the algorithm in instance
I′.
Let len(Xi) denote the length of the allocation each agent receives in the bottleneck set
Xi. Let
∼
Xl = {i ∈ Xl | len(A′i ∩ Di) ≥ len(Ai ∩ Di) = len(Ai)}12
∧
Xl = {i ∈ Xl | len(A′i ∩ Di) ≤ len(Ai)}
In other words
∼
Xl is the subset of agents of Xl who weakly gain in utility when the
agents in S misreport, and
∧
Xl is the subset of agents of Xl who weakly lose in utility
when the agents in S misreport. We will show that for all l = 1, . . . , k, Xl =
∧
Xl. This
would then directly imply that S must be empty since no coalition S can exist such that
by misreporting, everyone in the coalition is weakly better off and at least one agent in
the coalition is strictly better off.
We will prove this result via induction on k. In order to carry on with the induction,
we will show that no agent in X1 appears in the coalition S . We begin with a lemma.
Lemma 2. It is the case that X1 =
∼
X1. In other words, no agent in X1 is strictly worse
off when some subset of agents misreport their preference.
It is clear that
∼
X1 ⊆ X1. Suppose the claim does not hold, then there exists some
agent i ∈ X1\
∼
X1. In other words, agent i is strictly worse off due to the misreports.
Since an agent would only misreport his preference if misreporting weakly improves his
utility, we deduce that i < S , which implies that Di = D′i . Consequently, the following
set of inequalities hold for agent i:
len(A′i) = len(A′i ∩ D′i ) = len(A′i ∩ Di) < len(Ai),
where the first equality follows from the fact that A′i ⊆ D′i by the way the algorithm
allocates the pieces of cake to agents. The second equality follows from Di = D′i . And
the last inequality follows from i ∈ X1\
∼
X1.
We claim that since X1 is the first bottleneck set with respect to the true preference,
it cannot be the case that len(X′l ) = len(A′i) < len(Ai) = len(X1), where X′l is the
bottleneck set that i belongs to in the instance I′. Suppose this is the case, then we have
12 The fact that len(Ai ∩ Di) = len(Ai) makes use of the free disposal property, i.e. the allocation
that the mechanism gives agent i is a subset of the pieces desired by agent i under truthful
reports.
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that len(X′1) ≤ len(X′l ) < len(X1).13 It is clear that X′1 cannot contain an agent who
misreports in I′, since a misreporting agent in X′1 only receives a piece of cake with
length len(X′1) < len(X1), which is strictly less than what he would’ve gotten had he
reported truthfully. Hence, every agent in X′1 must report his true preference in I
′
. Since
X′1 is the first bottleneck set in I′, we have that
len(X′1) =
len((∪ j∈X′1 D′j) ∩ [0, 1])
|X′1|
=
len((∪ j∈X′1 D j) ∩ [0, 1])
|X′1|
≥
len((∪ j∈X1 D j) ∩ [0, 1])
|X1|
= len(X1),
where the first and third equalities follows from the way the algorithm makes
an allocation, the second equality follows from the fact that the agents in X′1 have
the same reports in I′ as in I, and the inequality follows from the fact that X1 ∈
arg minS⊆N
len((∪ j∈S D j∩[0,1]))
|S | . This contradicts the fact that len(X′1) < len(X1).
Lemma 3. It is the case that X1 =
∧
X1 =
∼
X1. In other words, no agent in X1 is strictly
better off when some subset of agents misreport their preference.
Since we have established that X1 =
∼
X1, and
∧
X1 ⊆ X1, it suffices to show that
∼
X1 ⊆
∧
X1. Suppose not, then for all i ∈ X1, we have that len(A′i ∩ Di) ≥ len(Ai) and there
exists some j ∈ X1 such that len(A′i ∩ D j) > len(A j). Summing over i ∈ X1, we get that
len(∪i∈X1 (A′i ∩ Di)) =
∑
i∈X1
len(A′i ∩ Di) >
∑
i∈X1
len(Ai) = len(∪i∈Xi Ai) = len(∪i∈Xi Di),
where the first two equalities follow from the fact that the Ai’s and A′i ∩ Di’s are dis-joint subsets and the third equality follows from the way the algorithm allocates to the
agents in the smallest bottleneck set. But this set of inequalities contradict the fact that
∪i∈X1 (A′i ∩ Di) ⊆ ∪i∈Xi Di, which implies that len(∪i∈X1 (A′i ∩ Di)) ≤ len(∪i∈Xi Di). Hence,
it must be the case that for every i ∈ X1, we have that len(A′i ∩ Di) = len(Ai), which
implies that i ∈
∧
X1.
Lemma 4. No agent in X1 appears in the coalition S and X1 is also the first bottleneck
set for I′.
By the previous lemma, no agent in
∧
X1 is strictly better off by misreporting his pref-
erence. Thus, any agent in X1 would potentially be in S if by misreporting, he makes
himself no worse off and simultaneously make some other agent in S strictly better off.
The only way that this can happen is by misreporting, the agents in X1 make their col-
lective claim over their desired pieces smaller, so that agents in later bottleneck set can
claim some of their desired pieces. On the other hand, the following inequality
len(∪i∈X1 D′i ) ≥ len(∪i∈X1 A′i) ≥ len(∪i∈X1(A′i ∩ Di)) = len(∪i∈Xi Di)
13 It is shown in [12] that the length of allocation of agents weakly increases with respect to the
index of bottleneck sets.
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implies that if any subset of agents of X1 wants to misreport so they are not worse
off, then collectively, they must over-report their preference to obtain allocations that
together is weakly larger in total than the allocations they would get had they reported
truthfully. Thus, having a subset of agents in X1 misreport will not benefit the other
agents in the coalition S . Hence, we may conclude that no agent in X1 appears in the
coalition S . Provided that every agent in X1 also reports truthfully in I′, there is no
incentive for an agent that belongs to a subsequent bottleneck set in I to misreport
and prevent X1 from being the first bottleneck set in I′ since that would make the
misreporting agent strictly worse off, as in doing so, he needs to create a bottleneck
set X′ such that len(X′) < len(X) and he would consequently receive an allocation of
len(X′).
Since no agent in X1 appears in the coalition S and X1 is also the first bottleneck set
for I′, we can remove X1 from N and ∪i∈X1 Ai from [0, 1] and do induction on the set of
remaining agents N\X1 and the remaining piece of cake [0, 1]\ ∪i∈X1 Ai to be allocated
and the proof is complete by invoking the inductive hypothesis with X2 being the first
bottleneck set in the new instance. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Consider the following math program
max
n∏
j=1
u j
s.t. u j =
k∑
i=1
vi jxi j ∀ j = 1, . . . , n
n∑
j=1
xi j ≤ li ∀i = 1, . . . , k
xi j ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
where li = len(Ji),
Notice that the feasible region of the math program contains all feasible allocations.
An optimal solution given by the LP is not Pareto dominated by any other feasible
allocation because that would contradict the optimality of the solution. Hence, it is
Pareto efficient.
To see that the optimal solution of the math program is also an envy free allocation,
if we instead view xi j as the fractional amount of Ji that is allocated to agent j, then
scaling the vi j’s appropriately (i.e. setting v′i j = vi jli), then solving the math program
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stated in the proposition is equivalent to solving the following math program.
max
n∏
j=1
u j
s.t. u j =
k∑
i=1
v′i jxi j ∀ j = 1, . . . , n
n∑
j=1
xi j ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, . . . , k
xi j ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
which in turn equivalent to solving
max
n∑
j=1
log u j
s.t. u j =
k∑
i=1
v′i jxi j ∀ j = 1, . . . , n
n∑
j=1
xi j ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, . . . , k
xi j ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
Notice that the above math program is a convex program since we are maximizing
a concave function (or equivalently minimizing a convex function) subject to linear
constraints.
In (pp 105-107, [32]), Vazirani invites us to consider a market setting of buyers
(agents) and divisible goods (intervals). Each good is assumed to be desired by at least
one buyer (i.e. for every good i, vi j > 0 for some buyer j). There is a unit of each good
and each buyer is given the same amount of money say 1 dollar, for which he uses to
purchases the good(s) that maximizes his utility subject to a set of given prices. The
task is to find a set of equilibrium prices such that the market clears (meaning all the
demands are met and no part of any item is leftover) when the buyers seek purchase
good(s) to maximize their utility given the equilibrium prices.
Using duality theory, one can interpret the dual variable pi associated with the
constraints
∑n
j=1 xi j ≤ 1 as the price of consuming a unit of good i. By invoking the
KKT conditions, Vazirani [32] shows the prices given by the optimal dual solution is a
unique set of equilibrium prices. Moreover, the primal optimal solution for each buyer
j is precisely the quantity of good(s) that the buyer ends up purchasing that maximizes
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his utility given the equilibrium prices.
Now we can argue as to why the optimal primal solution is an envy free allocation.
Because given the equilibrium prices, if a buyer desires another buyer’s allocation, since
he has the same purchasing power as any other buyer, he would instead use his money
to obtain the allocation of the buyer that he envies. This would result in some surplus
and deficit of goods, contradicting the fact that the given prices are equilibrium prices.
⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. For piecewise uniform valuations, it is known that CCEA is equivalent to mech-
anism 1 in [12], which we will refer to as SimpleCCEA. The remainder of the proof
will focus on showing the equivalence between SimpleCCEA and the convex program
for piecewise uniform valuations. To do so, given an allocation of SimpleCCEA, which
is a feasible solution of the convex program, we will find a set of prices corresponding
to the allocation and show that the prices are in fact the equilibrium prices defined by
Vazirani on pages 105-107 of [32]. Moreover, this allocation would be an allocation
that maximizes the agents’ utility given the equilibrium prices.
Using the same notations as those in [12], given a valuation profile, let B be the set
of buyers/agents and G be the set of goods or intervals. Let S i be the i-th bottleneck set
computed by SimpleCCEA, i.e. S i = S min ∈ arg minS ′⊆S avg(S ′, Xi) in the i-th iteration
of the subroutine of SimpleCCEA.
Let Gi be the set of goods that are distributed amongst the buyers in S i. In the convex
program, since each buyer is endowed with 1 dollar and every buyer in S i receives
avg(S i, Xi) units of good(s), it is natural to define the price of a unit of each good k ∈ Gi
to be
pk =
1
avg(S i, Xi) =
|S i|
len(D(S i, Xi)) .
Notice that the prices for each good is well defined (i.e. each good has exactly one
nonnegative price). This follows from the following observations:
(i) ∪Gi = G (or every good has at least one price). This follows from the assumption
that every good is desired by at least one agent, which means that SimpleCCEA
will allocate all of the goods.
(ii) Gi ∩ G j = ∅ for all i , j (or every good has at most one price). This follows
from the fact that no fractional parts of any good is allocated to agents from two
or more bottleneck sets, which another algorithmic property of SimpleCCEA.
To show that the pk’s form a set of equilibrium prices, we will show that given the
pk’s, the buyers in every S i will choose to purchase only goods from Gi to maximize
their utility function. We will do induction on the number of bottleneck sets. Consider
the first bottleneck set S 1, we will show that
Lemma 5. G1 are the only items that are desirable by buyers in S 1.
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Proof. SimpleCCEA finds S 1 by solving a parametrized max flow problem on a bipar-
tite network. The network has a node for every buyer and a node for every good. There
is a directed edge from a buyer i to a good j with infinite capacity if good j is desired
by buyer i. In addition, there is a source s and a sink t. There is a directed edge from s
to each buyer i with capacity λ and a directed edge from edge good j to t with capacity
equaling the quantity of good j. λ is set to 0 initially so that the unique min cut in the
network for λ = 0 is {s, B∪G ∪ t}. λ is gradually raised until {s, B∪G ∪ t} is no longer
the unique min cut, at which point S 1 and G1 are found by looking for another min cut
of the form {s ∪ S 1 ∪G1, B\S 1 ∪G\G1 ∪ t}. Since {s ∪ S 1 ∪G1, B\S 1 ∪G\G1 ∪ t} is a
min cut, it must be the case that G1 = nbr(S 1) in the network, which proves the lemma.
(If nbr(S 1)\G1 , ∅, then there will be an infinite capacity edge crossing the cut. On the
other hand, if G1\nbr(S 1) , ∅, then replacing G1 with nbr(S 1) on the s side of the cut
would give a cut with a smaller capacity.) ⊓⊔
Since the agents have piecewise uniform valuation, in the setting of the convex
program, each buyer in S 1 has the same utility for the items that he desire in G1.
Moreover, given that the prices of goods are identical in G1, each buyer is indifferent
between choosing among his desirable items for the best item in terms of bang per
buck. Hence, for all buyers in S 1, the allocation given by SimpleCCEA maximizes
buyer’s utility given the prices pk’s. Moreover, notice that the money of buyers in S 1
and goods in G1 are exhausted by the allocation given by SimpleCCEA.
After the goods in G1 are allocated to the buyers in S 1 we repeat the same argument
for the remaining buyers and goods and the inductive hypothesis allows to conclude
that for every i and for all buyers in S i, the allocation given by SimpleCCEA maximizes
buyer’s utility given the prices pk’s. Moreover, the money of buyers in S i and goods in
Gi are exhausted by the allocation given by SimpleCCEA. There is a slight difference
between the inductive step and the base case, as it is possible that some buyer b in B\S i
also desires certain goods in G j for some j < i. However, Chen et al. [12] state that
avg(S i, Xi) is a weakly increasing function of i, which means that pi = 1/avg(S i, Xi)
is a weakly decreasing function of i. Since we are dealing with piecewise uniform
valuations, the utility of a buyer over his desirable goods are identical, this means that
for any buyer in S i, the goods that maximize his bang for buck are in Gi.
Putting everything together and we have shown that pk’s constitute the set of equi-
librium prices and SimpleCCEA gives an equilibrium allocation, which is an optimal
solution to the convex program. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 8
Consider the following profile of two agents.
Profile 1:
v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.2], v1(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.2, 1].
v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.6], v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ (0.6, 1].
The uniform allocation rule gives us the allocation:
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Y1 : { 12 [0, 0.2], 12 (0.6, 1]}.
Y2 : { 12 [0, 0.2], 12 (0.6, 1]}.
Let A ⊂ (0.6, 1] be the allocation that agent 2 receives in this case.
Now consider profile 2:
v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.2], v1(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.2, 1].
v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.1]\A, v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ A.
The uniform allocation rule gives us the allocation:
Y1 : { 12 [0, 0.2], 12 A}.
Y2 : { 12 [0, 0.2], 12 A}.
Hence, agent 2 in profile 2 would misreport so that the reported profile is profile 1.
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. We first prove that CSD is well-defined and results in a feasible allocation in
which each agent gets 1/n size of the cake. Let J ′ = {J1, . . . , Jℓ} be a partitioning of
the interval [0, 1] induced by the discontinuities in agent valuations and the cake cuts in
the n! cake allocations. We make a couple of claims about J ′ that following from the
way J ′ is constructed.
Claim. An agent is completely indifferent over each subinterval in J ′.
Claim. Let Xπi denote a maximum preference cake piece of size 1/n chosen by agent i
in the serial order π. For each J ∈ J ′ either Xπi contains J completely or it does not
contain any part of J.
Now consider a matrix of dimension n! × ℓ: B = (bi j) such that bi j = 1 if J j ⊂ Xπi
and bi j = 0 if J j 1 Xπi . Since for each π ∈ ΠN , each agent i ∈ N gets 1/n of the cake in
Xπi , then it follows that
∑n!
i=1
∑ℓ
j=1 bi jlen(J j) = n!/n. Hence,
ℓ∑
j=1
n!∑
i=1
bi jlen(J j)/n! = 1/n.
Also consider a matrix of dimension n × ℓ: M = (mi j) such that mi j denotes the
fraction of J j that agent i gets in Yi. From the algorithm CSD, we know that mi j =
count(i,J j)
n! J where count(i, J j) is the number of permutations in which i gets J j. It is
immediately seen that each column sums up to 1. Hence each J j is complete allocated
34
to the agents. We now prove that each agent gets a total cake piece of size 1/n. We do
so by showing that ∑ℓj=1 mi jlen(J j) = 1/n.
1/n =
ℓ∑
j=1
n!∑
i=1
bi jlen(J j)/n! =
ℓ∑
j=1
(
n!∑
i=1
bi j)len(J j)/n! =
ℓ∑
j=1
(count(i, J j))len(J j)/n!
=
ℓ∑
j=1
(count(i, J j)
n!
)len(J j) =
ℓ∑
j=1
mi jlen(J j).
Hence Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) the allocation returned by CSD is a proper allocation of the
cake in which each agent gets a total cake piece of size 1/n. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. We first argue for proportionality of CSD. In the case where all agents have the
same valuations as the valuation of i, i is guaranteed 1/n of the value of the whole cake
because of anonymity of CSD. First note that for each π ∈ ΠN and preferences V−i of
all agents other than i, Vi(CSDπ(Vi,V−i)) ≥ Vi(CSDπ(Vi, (Vi, . . . ,Vi))).
The reason is that when valuations are not identical, predecessors of i in π
leave weakly better cake for i as when their valuations are same as agent i. Hence,
Vi(CSD(Vi,V−i)) ≥ Vi(CSD(Vi, (Vi, . . . ,Vi))) = Vi([0, 1])/n.
Finally, note that when an agent selects his best possible cake piece in each permu-
tation, the exact height of the valuation function is not relevant and only the relative
height matters. Hence, CSD in fact satisfies robust proportionality. Symmetry for CSD
follows directly from symmetry for RSD. ⊓⊔
Proof of Remark 2
CSD would not be strategyproof if the fraction of each subinterval of J ′ is allocated
deterministically and the allocation is made public information before the agents submit
their valuation function. To see this, consider the following example of two agents.
Profile 1:
v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], v1(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.5, 1].
v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.5, 1].
Running CSD gives us the allocation:
Y1 : { 12 [0, 0.5], 12 (0.5, 1]}.
Y2 : { 12 [0, 0.5], 12 (0.5, 1]}.
Profile 2:
v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], v1(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.5, 1].
v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.25], v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ (0.25, 0.75], v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.75, 1].
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Running CSD gives us the allocation:
Y1 = {[0, 0.25], 12 (0.25, 0.5], 12 (0.75, 1]}.
Y2 = { 12 [0.25, 0.5], (0.5, 0.75], 12 (0.75, 1]}.
Now it is possible that the CSD mechanism decides to gives [0, 0.25] ∪ (0.75, 1]
to agent 1 and [0.25, 0.75] to agent 2 in profile 1. Consequently, know-
ing this, agent 2 in profile 2 would misreport his valuation function to be
v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.5, 1] in order to receive the alloca-
tion given in profile 1 and gain utility in doing so.
Proof of Proposition 11
Consider the profiles P and Pi, where P is a profile where every agent reports truthfully
and Pi is a profile where agent i misreports while fixing every other agent’s report to be
the same as that in P. Let σ denote a permutation of [n] = {1, . . . , n} and let S denote
the set of all permutations of [n]. Let J1, . . . , Jk denote the intervals whose fractional
allocations are specified to each agent by CSD in profile P and J′1, . . . , J
′
k′ denote the
intervals whose fractional allocations are specified to each agent by CSD in profile Pi.
Let Vi(J) denote agent i’s total utility derived from receiving the interval J and Vi(A(σ))
and Vi(A′(σ)) denote the agent i’s total utility derived from his allocated pieces when
the serial ordering of the agents is σ in profile P and Pi respectively. Let pi j denote
the probability that interval J j is assigned to agent i. Since random serial dictatorship is
strategyproof in expectation, we have that
k∑
j=1
pi jVi(J j) =
∑
σ∈S
1
n!
Vi(A(σ)) ≥
∑
σ∈S
1
n!
Vi(A′(σ)) =
k′∑
j=1
pi jVi(J′j)
Now CSD views pi j as allocating a pi j fraction of interval J j to agent i. In order for a
deviating agent to properly evaluate the utility derived from his allocation in the deviat-
ing profile Pi, we have to come up with an allocation rule that actually attains the utility∑k′
j=1 pi jVi(J′j) for agent i (either deterministically or in expectation) when the profile
of reports is Pi. In particular, say if we want to allocate a subinterval of Ji with length
pi j times that of Ji to agent i at random, then this random allocation rule must satisfy
the property that
∑k′
j=1 E[Vi(Ai j)] = pi jVi(J′j), where Ai j ⊂ J′j such that |Ai j| = pi j|Ai j|.
In order to do so, we will show that the randomized allocation rule for CSD satisfy the
property that every agent i and interval J j, we have that E[Vi(Ai j)] = pi jVi(J′j) for all
valuation functions Vi, where Ai j ⊂ J′j such that |Ai j| = pi j|Ai j|.
Notice that mod(U j +∑i−1k=1 pn j(b j − a j)) is uniformly distributed on [a j, b j] and Ai j
has length pi j(b j − a j). The fact that E[Vi(Ai j)] = pi jVi(J′j) follows from the following
lemma.
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Lemma 6. Let U be uniformly distributed on the interval [a, b] and let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Let
A = [U,U + α(b − a)] if U + α(b − a) ≤ b and A = [a,U − (1 − α)(b − a)] ∪ [U, b] if
U + α(b − a) > b, then we have that EU[Vi(A)] = αVi([a, b]), where Vi(X) =
∫
X vi(x)dxfor any integrable function vi.
Proof. Define v¯i = vi for a ≤ x ≤ b and v¯i(x) = v¯i(x+ (b− a)) for x outside [a, b]. Since
v¯i is periodic, then it suffices to show that
EU[Vi(A)] =
∫ b
a
∫ x+α(b−a)
x
v¯i(y)dy 1b − a dx = α
∫ b
a
v¯i(x)dx = αVi([a, b]).
By drawing a picture of the region that we evaluate the integral over and due to the fact
that v¯i is periodic, we have that
1
b − a
∫ b
a
∫ x+α(b−a)
x
v¯i(y)dydx = 1b − a
∫ b
a
v¯i(y)
∫ y
y−α(b−a)
dxdy = α
∫ b
a
v¯i(x)dx,
which proves the lemma. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Let a = [0, 0.25], b = (0.25, 0.5], c = (0.5, 0.75], d = (0.75, 1]. Consider the
following two profiles of valuations.
Profile 1:
v1(x) = 4 if x ∈ a, v1(x) = 3 if x ∈ b, v1(x) = 2 if x ∈ c, v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ d.
v2(x) = 3 if x ∈ a, v2(x) = 4 if x ∈ b, v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ c, v2(x) = 2 if x ∈ d.
Running CSD gives us the allocation:
Y1 = { 12 a,
1
2 b,
1
2 c,
1
2 d}.
Y2 = { 12 a,
1
2 b,
1
2 c,
1
2 d}.
Profile 2:
v1(x) = 4 if x ∈ a, v1(x) = 2 if x ∈ b, v1(x) = 3 if x ∈ c, v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ d.
v2(x) = 2 if x ∈ a, v2(x) = 4 if x ∈ b, v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ c, v2(x) = 3 if x ∈ d.
Running CSD gives us the allocation:
Y1 = {a, c}.
Y2 = {b, d}.
Hence, agents with true valuation in profile 1 would misreport together to profile 2,
which means that CSD is not group strategyproof for 2 agents. ⊓⊔
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Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. There are three agents, each with piecewise uniform valuation function.
v1(x) = 1.5 for x ∈ [0, 2/3] and 0 otherwise.
v2(x) = 1.5 for x ∈ [0, 1/3]∪ (2/3, 1] and 0 otherwise.
v3(x) = 1.5 for x ∈ (1/3, 1] and 0 otherwise.
Let a = [0, 1/3], b = (1/3, 2/3], c = (2/3, 1].
We adopt the following implementation of CSD: when it is agent i’s turn to pick,
out of the pieces of the remaining cake that he likes, he takes the left-most such piece
with length 1/n, where n is the number of agents.
If the priority ordering were 1, 2, 3, then a feasible assignment that respects the
preferences is 1 ← a, 2 ← c, 3 ← b.
If the priority ordering were 1,3,2, then a feasible assignment that respects the pref-
erences is 1 ← a, 3 ← b, 2 ← c.
If the priority ordering were 2, 1, 3, then a feasible assignment that respects the
preferences is 2 ← a, 1 ← b, 3 ← c.
If the priority ordering were 2, 3, 1, then a feasible assignment that respects the
preferences is 2 ← a, 3 ← b, 1 ← c.
If the priority ordering were 3, 1, 2, then a feasible assignment that respects the
preferences is 3 ← b, 1 ← a, 2 ← c.
If the priority ordering were 3, 2, 1, then a feasible assignment that respects the
preferences is 3 ← b, 2 ← a, 1 ← c. Then, the CSD allocation is as follows.
Y1 = {
1
2
[0, 1/3], 16(1/3, 2/3],
1
3(2/3, 1]}
Y2 = {
1
2
[0, 1/3], 1
2
(2/3, 1]}
Y3 = {
5
6(1/3, 2/3],
1
6(2/3, 1]}
Clearly, agent 1 envies agent 3 in this case. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof (Sketch). Consider a fractional assignment p returned by the CC algorithm. With-
out private endowments CC is equivalent to the EPS algorithm of Katta and Sethuraman
[18]. Assignment p satisfies justified envy-freeness in presence of variable eating rates:
ui(pi) ≥ (ci/c j)ui(p j) for all utilities u consistent with preferences of i over the houses.
The informal intuition is that at any point during the running of CC, an agent i with a
higher eating rate than j will be ‘eating’ his most favoured object(s) faster than j even
if j is also has the eating the same object(s). Hence, for all v′i ∈ ˆVi, it is the case that for
j , i,
∫
Xi
v′i(x)dx ≥ (ci/c j)
∫
X j
v′i(x)dx. ⊓⊔
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Proof of Proposition 16
Proof (Sketch). Given a variable claim instance I of n agents where agent i has claim
rate ci for i = 1, . . . , n. We may assume without lost of generality that the claim rates are
integral. If they are not, then we can simply multiple each claim rate ci by a common
denominator to make each ci integral. Doing so will not change the allocation given by
the algorithm since only relative claim rates matter to the algorithm.
Now consider a cake cutting instance I′ of ∑ni=1 ci agents, where the agents have piece-
wise uniform utility function and there are no private endowments or variable claims.
Moreover, for every i = 1, . . . , n, there are ci agents in I′ each of whom has the same
utility function as that of agent i in I. It is not difficult to see that if one aggregates the
allocation that the ci agents in I′ who share agent i’s valuation in I, then one would get
an equivalent allocation (in terms of utility) to agent i’s allocation.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that CCEA is not GSP for the case of variable
claims, then in some instance I, there exists some coalition S of the agents that weakly
gains in utility by misreporting their preference. Now consider the equivalent instance
I′ with no variable claims under the aforementioned transformation, then there exists
some coalition S ′ of the agents in I′ that weakly gains in utility by misreporting their
preference, which implies that CCEA is not group-strategyproof for the no variable
claims case, contradicting the result of Proposition 4. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 17
Proof. The allocation can be obtained by solving the following convex program.
min −
n∑
j=1
c jlog(u j)
s.t. u j =
k∑
i=1
vi jxi j ∀ j = 1, . . . , n
n∑
j=1
xi j ≤ li ∀i = 1, . . . , k
xi j ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
The proof of the desired properties is similar to the case where c j = 1. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 18
Proof (Sketch). Consider a fractional assignment p returned by the CC algorithm.We
know that p satisfies justified envy-freeness for the random/fractional assignment prob-
lem (Prop. 4, [1]). If pi %S Di p j, then ∀v′i ∈ ˆVi :
∫
Xi
v′i(x)dx ≥
∫
X j
v′i(x)dx. If ¬(pi %S Dj e j),
then ∃v′j ∈ vˆ j :
∫
Xi
v′j(x)dx <
∫
ω( j) v
′
j(x)dx. Hence X satisfies justified envy-freeness for
private endowments. ⊓⊔
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